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1. Introduction 
The financing of universal service provision in network industries has tradition-
ally relied on granting the provider a reserved area. The need for alternative fund-
ing sources after full liberalization has increased the interest of regulators and the 
public in knowing the cost of universal services because the universal service 
provider (USP) should be correctly compensated for its burden. This implies 
knowing the net cost of the universal service obligation (USO) as measured by the 
profitability cost approach pioneered by Panzar (2000) and Cremer et al. (2000). 
Calculating the net cost of the USO is currently an important topic in the Euro-
pean postal sector because markets have recently been fully opened to competi-
tion in many countries. The net cost of the USO according to profitability cost is 
the difference in the USP’s profit with and without this obligation.1 The profitabil-
ity approach has been practically implemented in a number of countries.
2
 In all of 
these cases, the costing of universal services has been treated separately from its 
financing. 
Only recently it has been argued that the market structure and the burden of 
the USO are directly related to other regulations and the funding mechanism in 
place. Jaag et al. (2009) provide an outline of how changes in the USP’s cost 
structure affect pricing, market equilibria and hence indirectly the net cost. They 
also show that individual elements or dimensions of the USO cannot be priced 
separately as this would either result in inconsistent or biased net cost estimates. 
Boldron et al. (2009) argue that the effective cost/burden of USO is endogenous 
to regulation and funding mechanisms. Similar points are raised in Borsenberger 
et al. (2010) and in Jaag and Trinkner (2011) who discuss the appropriate tax base 
for a sharing mechanism and the competitive impact of various cost sharing and 
compensation mechanisms on the competitive equilibrium, respectively. Jaag 
(2011) discusses the importance of a thorough definition of the counterfactual 
scenario – whether there is no USO at all or universal services are provided by an 
alternative operator – and its impact on the net cost of the USO. 
Based on these considerations, it is apparent that merely calculating the net 
cost of a universal service obligation may not be adequate when devising fair 
                                                 
1
 Annex I of the Third Postal Directive defines the net cost calculation as follows: “The net cost of 
universal service obligations is any cost related to and necessary for the operation of the universal 
service provision. The net cost of universal service obligations is to be calculated, as the difference 
between the net cost for a designated universal service provider of operating with the universal 
service obligations and the same postal service provider operating without the universal service 
obligations.” 
2
 See Copenhagen Economics (2008), Bergum (2008), Frontier Economics (2008) and Cohen et al. 
(2010) for recent applications of the profitability cost approach in the postal sector. Jaag et al. 
(2011) discuss these approaches. 
1
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compensation for a universal service provider. Consequently, the Third Postal 
Directive 2008/6/EC in Article 7 states that:
3
“Where a Member State determines that the universal service obli-
gations […] entail a net cost […] and represent an unfair financial 
burden on the universal service provider(s), it may introduce: 
 a mechanism to compensate the undertaking(s) concerned from 
public funds; or 
 a mechanism for the sharing of the net cost of the universal ser-
vice obligations between providers of services and/or users.” 
Hence, a compensation for the USP may only be introduced if the USO entails a 
net cost and represents an unfair burden. While there is quite a comprehensive 
literature on the costing of the USO, there has been little discussion so far as to 
how exactly define an unfair burden. This paper aims at filling this gap. It pro-
vides hints at potential unintended consequences of implementing a compensation 
or cost sharing mechanism. Thereby, it adds to the foundations for an informed 
debate about the appropriate compensation for the provision of universal services. 
However, it does not weigh in on the current debate about the appropriate scope 
of the USO.
4
Under what conditions the net cost of the USO represents an unfair burden 
on the USP is a debatable question. Boldron et al. (2009) argue that several crite-
ria of unfairness may be relevant: When the burden exceeds a certain portion of 
the USP’s profit, when it prevents the USP from making a “reasonable profit” or 
when the USP’s profits are low compared to those of its competitors. In the litera-
ture, the criterion referring to a reasonable profit has often been used: According 
to this criterion, compensation should ensure that the USP collects a sufficient 
level of profit.
5
As long as no other operator is involved in financing the burden of the USO, 
it makes indeed sense to focus on the effect of the USO on the USP’s profit only.
However, if competitors have to contribute to the funding of the USO, also 
changes in their profit may have to be considered when determining whether a 
burden on the USP is unfair.
6
Such a comparative notion of fairness is supported 
                                                
3
The same rules for compensating the net cost also apply in the telecommunications sector; see 
Directive 97/33/EC on interconnection in telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal 
service and interoperability through application of the principles of Open Network Provision 
(ONP) and Directive 2002/22/EC (Universal Service Directive). 
4
See Jaag and Trinkner (2011) for a discussion of how the USO might be adapted in the future. 
5
See e.g. Crew and Kleindorfer (1998), De Donder (2006), Borsenberger et al. (2010), and Gauti-
er and Paolini (2010). 
6
While the Third Postal Directive only refers to an unfair burden on the USP, also its competitors 
may be relevant due to the possibly comparative nature of the fairness concept. 
2
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by theories of other-regarding preferences which play a key role in the literature 
on the economics of fairness. E.g. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ock-
enfels (2000) find evidence suggesting that individuals value the payoff of refer-
ence individuals positively, hence exhibiting inequity aversion. For the notion of 
fairness, this implies that an individual’s payoff (or a firm’s profit) should be 
compared to an equitable benchmark, which may take into account also others’ 
payoffs. 
This paper adopts four different criteria to assess the (un- )fairness of a bur-
den and hence the appropriateness and the level of compensation. The four criteria 
differ by the relevant equitable benchmark (see Figure 1): The first criterion () 
sets the USP’s profit in relation to its profit without universal service provision. 
Hence, the equitable benchmark is the USP’s profit without USO. The second 
criterion () considers the USP’s absolute profit level, the equitable benchmark 
being an exogenously defined appropriate profit level. The third criterion () 
compares the USP’s profit to a competitor’s, which serves as the equitable 
benchmark. The fourth criterion () compares changes in the USP’s and a com-
petitor’s profits due to the USO. Hence, in this case, the equitable benchmark for 
the change in the USP’s profit is the change in a competitor’s profit. The latter 
two criteria are more difficult to implement than the first two because they also 
depend on the competitor’s profit. However, they are much closer to the notion of 
fairness in the economic literature on fairness, reciprocity and altruism (see Fehr 









Figure 1: Approaches to the notion of unfair burden. 
 
We explore the effect of these criteria in the USP’s compensation on the competi-
tive outcome by allowing for three compensation means which are compliant with 




State funding – The USP’s net cost of providing universal services is reimbursed 
with funds provided by the general government budget. In this scheme, no opera-
tor in the postal market contributes specifically to the funding of the USO. 
                                                 
7
 See Oxera (2007) for a comprehensive discussion of various funding mechanisms. 
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Compensation fund – All operators contribute to a compensation fund with a 
uniform tax. The USP’s net cost is reimbursed by the collected funds. In such a 
system, the USP has to partly compensate the net cost himself.  
“Pay or play” – Operators that provide universal services (“play”) are exempt 
from contributing to the compensation fund (“pay”). 
We discuss the implication of these funding mechanisms on the fairness of a USO 
burden in the postal sector. The topic strongly relates to EU state aid rules with 




The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses a 
stylized model of the postal sector which allows to discuss the USO, its net cost 
and its financing. In section 3, four criteria for assessing the (un-)fairness of a 
burden and their effect on the operators’ profits are presented and discussed. Sec-
tion 4 explores the effect of price regulation on the compensation of the USO net 
cost. Section 5 concludes. 
2. A Model of Competition in the Postal Sector  
Our model approach is similar to the one presented by Valletti et al. (2002): There 
are two firms        each one offering postal services which are imperfect subs-
titutes. There is a continuum           of different markets, where   is the size 
of the total market. We use a geographical interpretation of a market, such that 
market   stands for a local delivery route. Hence, the market can be divided into 
segments by region of delivery. If firm   decides to enter a certain market   it has 
to pay the fixed cost associated to that market     , where we assume that 
       .9 For the sake of simplicity, we make the following further assump-
tions: 
Assumption 1: Markets are independent of each other. This implies that the com-
petitive situation in one market does not affect the cost structure or demand in 
another market. 
                                                 
8
 See e.g. Oxera (2007) or Holzleitner (2010). See also Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans GmbH und 
Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg gegen Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH [2003] ECR I-
7747. 
9 
In the following we will refer to the fixed cost associated with serving a market as “incremental 
coverage cost” in the sense that it is the cost incurred when an operator extends its regional pres-
ence marginally. 
4
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Assumption 2: There are two symmetric operators. They possess the same tech-
nology (cost function) and compete in horizontally differentiated products. 
 
Assumption 3: There is no reserved area; all markets are open to competition. 
The sequence of decisions is as follows: First, a profit-maximizing incumbent 
chooses its optimum market coverage (geographical area coverage). Second, an 
entrant (competitor) sets its optimum coverage. Third, both operators set a profit-
maximizing price for each of the delivery markets. 
 
Marginal cost is constant and by Assumption 2 the same for both operators. In 
every market   each operator makes a gross profit (or surplus) amounting to 
    .10 Because all markets share the same demand characteristics and variable 
costs, the equilibrium prices and therefore also gross profit   in each market de-
pend only on the number of competitors.
11
 Typically, in the postal sector, 
            for at least two operators, while             even for a 
single operator. This is what we assume for the following analysis. It implies that 
some regions are attractive to serve while others are not and market entry will 
generally occur, albeit not with full coverage. This is e.g. the case in Sweden 
where the incumbent’s biggest rival Bring CityMail delivers only in the most 
densely populated areas. 
From the perspective of operators, local delivery markets are ranked by in-
creasing order of cost. Without USO, operators begin to cover the most densely 
populated areas and continue to cover less densely areas as long as it is profitable. 
Hence, each operator starts offering services from the market with the highest 
gross profit and leaves no gaps between served markets. If operator   serves all 
markets         its total profit is 
 
                
  
 
  (1) 
 
  
                                                 
10
 Note that the surplus in each market results from selling a range of products in that market. It 
does not matter how many products are concerned (or e.g. whether or not they are in the product 
scope of the USO). 
11
 There is no reason for price differentiation within markets with the same number of operator but 
different fixed costs because there is no differentiation of marginal cost and demand characteris-
tics. 
5
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Solving the model backwards yields for the optimum market coverages of the 
entrant and the incumbent, respectively: 
  
 
                      
  
 
  (2) 
                         
  
 
  (3) 
Due to the assumptions made, total cost is convex. This implies that only one type 
of asymmetric equilibrium can arise in which one operator is bigger than the oth-
er. Here, given the sequence in Assumption 3, the entrant’s coverage,     is lower 
than the incumbent’s,   .12 This is due to the incremental surplus in the monopo-
listic markets being larger than in the duopolistic markets:  
There is a mutual business stealing (quantity effect) and competitive pres-
sure on prices in the duopoly region (price effect) such that 
              
              (4) 
Hence, in the absence of a universal service obligation, the specific cost structure 
together with the market penetration decisions result in a natural segmentation of 
the entire market into three regions (see Figure 2):
13
 
(1) In attractive local delivery markets (e.g. densely populated delivery areas 
with low wage levels), it is feasible for both companies to operate in parallel 
(“competitive region”,     ). 
(2) In less attractive local delivery markets (e.g. semi-rural areas), an operator 
can make a profit only if there is no competitor. Hence, there will be a mo-
nopolistic operator in equilibrium (“monopolistic region”,        ). 
(3) In the least attractive local delivery markets (e.g. rural and / or high wage 
areas), incremental coverage costs are higher than incremental surplus, such 
that no operator serves these markets voluntarily (“unserved region”,   
  ).  
The horizontal lines at   and    in Figure 2 represent the incremental gross surplus 
in each market with two and one operators, respectively. The straight line with 
                                                 
12
 In our model it is the sequence of decisions that results in the incumbent always serving at equi-
librium a larger proportion of the market. This sequence reflects that the incumbent operator has 
traditionally been serving all markets due to the USO.  
13
 See Jaag (2011) for an in-depth discussion of such market segmentation. 
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positive slope illustrates the incremental coverage cost associated with serving 













Figure 2: The segmentation of the postal market. 
 
We define the USO in line with the Third Postal Directive to consist of the obliga-
tion to serve all regions up to   .14 However, there is no uniform tariff constraint.15 
Hence, the introduction of a USO forces the USP to also serve markets      in 
which the incremental cost exceeds the incremental surplus from extending mar-
ket coverage.
16
 This obligation replaces the operator’s coverage decision in the 
sequence of decisions and potentially necessitates some kind of compensation. 
For the ease of analysis, we make a simplifying assumption on the financing of 
such compensation: 
 
Assumption 4: If operators contribute to compensating the net cost of universal 
service provision, the necessary funds are collected through profit taxation. 
 
Compared to other taxation schemes (e.g. based on turnover or per unit), profit 
taxation considerably simplifies our analysis because the operators’ market cover-
age decisions are not distorted by their contributions to the USO fund.
17
 Hence, by 
                                                 
14
 Art. 3 “Member States shall ensure that users enjoy the right to a universal service involving the 
permanent provision of a postal service of specified quality at all points in their territory [...].” 
15
 This implies that we employ only a partial definition of the USO. Of course, in reality the USO 
may comprise several other dimensions, such as a minimum delivery frequency or the definition of 
certain services to be offered at regulated terms. See e.g. Panzar (2008) who discusses the role of 
postal rates on the costing of the USO. 
16
 Other interpretations of the USO are conceivable, e.g. that the USO only applies to regions 
which would be unserved without regulation. See Jaag (2011) for a discussion of such a USO 
definition. 
17
 A downside of the profit tax approach is that compared to other funding approaches, as e.g. unit 
taxes or turnover taxes, it may lead to more difficulties in allocating the contributions across oper-
     
0          
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restricting our analysis to profit taxation, we exclude potential strategic behavior 
by firms reacting to the financing mechanism. Such behavior is analyzed in detail 
by Jaag and Trinkner (2011). 
Assumptions 14 allow us to define the profits in each of the three markets 
separately: The two operators’ economic profit in the competitive markets is equal 
to 
              
  
 
    (5) 
The economic profit in the markets which are served by only one operator in equi-
librium is equal to 




The USP’s economic profit in the markets which would not be served in the ab-
sence of a USO is 




Hence, the entrant’s total economic profit without USO is equal to area   in Fig-
ure 2, 
      (8) 
The incumbent’s economic profit without USO is equal to the areas     in Fig-
ure 2, 
  
          (9) 
Assuming that the incumbent will be the USP, its economic profit with USO but 
without compensation is equal to 
          (10) 
Profit levels with and without USO very much depend on the regulatory environ-
ment of the two scenarios, which affects the operators’ surplus and cost functions, 
                                                                                                                                     
ators due to the risk of inconsistent accounting policies being adopted. See Borsenberger et al. 
(2010) and Jaag and Trinkner (2011) for a discussion of the effect of various taxation schemes on 
the costing and financing of the USO. 
8
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     and     , respectively. We assume that the only difference between the two 
scenarios with and without USO is that in the former the USP is forced to cover 
all markets. Specifically, we make the following assumption: 
 
Assumption 5: There is no profit-oriented regulation of the USP’s pricing other 




Assumption 5 implies that prices contribute toward the funding of the USO but 
are not used as a regulatory dimension. We will discuss the implications of this 
assumption in more detail in Section 4. As discussed above, we consider three 





(1) External financing (“ext”): The burden is financed by state funding; hence, 
there are no specific taxes imposed on postal operators,   
      
     . 
 
(2) Everyone pays (“fund”): Both operators contribute equally to a universal 
services fund   
       
    
. The total tax base equals the two operators’ 
joint profits before compensation:       . 
 
(3) Pay or play (“pop”): Only the competitor contributes to the funding of the 
USO,   
      
     , the total tax base is equal to its profit  . 
 
Hence, after compensation, the two operators’ profits are respectively equal to 
 
   
       
                      (11) 
 
   
       
            
     




   is the gross transfer the USP receives as compensation. According to the defi-
nition in Annex I of the Third Postal Directive, the net cost of USO is equal to 
 
   
                        (13) 
                                                 
18 Imposing a general breakeven constraint on the USP’s but not on the competitor’s pricing would 
intervene with the compensation criteria and the employed notion of fairness such that the problem 
of determining the level of compensation would be over-specified. Moreover, after full market 
opening and with the development of competition, there is a priori no reason for price regulation 
other than as part of the USO (see e.g. Panzar, 2002). 
19
 Traditionally, reserved areas have been used to finance the USO. We do not consider them here, 
because they are no longer allowed in the framework of the Third Postal Directive. 
9
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The Third Postal Directive also imposes rules on accounting separation as a basis 
for the calculation of the USO net cost (Art. 14, Para. 2): 
“The universal service provider(s) shall keep separate accounts 
within their internal accounting systems in order to clearly distin-
guish between each of the services and products which are part of 
the universal service and those which are not. This accounting se-
paration shall be used as an input when Member States calculate 
the net cost of the universal service. Such internal accounting sys-
tems shall operate on the basis of consistently applied and objec-
tively justifiable cost accounting principles.” 
In the calculation of the USO net cost, according to Annex I of the Third Postal 
Directive, the profit level of the entire operator is relevant, not the profit of indi-
vidual services. Our model shows that in general, in order to calculate the USO 
net cost, there may not be a necessity to distinguish between the services and 
products which are part of the universal service and those which are not. Howev-
er, there is a need for another separation, namely between products or services 
which are affected by the USO and those which are not. There are two ways by 
which a non-USO product or service are potentially affected by the USO: First, 
there may be economies of scope between USO and non-USO products, such that 
e.g. with a USO, non-USO products are voluntarily offered in all markets     , 
which would not be profitable in the absence of the USO. Second, if there is a tax 
on all products, also non-USO products have to contribute to the funding of the 
USO. 
It is apparent that there is an inherent difficulty in the calculation of the 
USO net cost due to non-observability: The competitor’s profit   is an “existing 
number” which is observable (at least by itself and its shareholders). The USP’s 
profit       “exists” as well. Therefore, the difference between the two, 
   , in principle can be calculated. However,   and   are not observable sepa-
rately and cannot be computed directly because they exist only in the counterfac-
tual scenario without USO. We will return to this issue in the context of the ap-
proaches to the definition of an unfair burden discussed in the next section. 
3. Approaches to the Notion of Unfair Burden 
With respect to the notion of an unfair burden, there are two fundamental but dis-
tinct questions to be answered: 
When is there a burden? What is the criterion for implementing a compensation 
or cost sharing mechanism? 
10
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What is the appropriate compensation such that there is no remaining unfair bur-
den? 
 
The net transfer to compensate the USP is 
 
      
      (14) 
 
If the USO net cost and its financing are calculated sequentially, this net transfer 
does not take into account the financing mechanism. Hence, the relevant criterion 
for compensation is met ex ante (but not necessarily ex post), which helps answer-
ing the first question. If there is an integrated calculation of the net cost of the 
USO and its financing, the net transfer meets the relevant criterion ex post (but 
not necessarily ex ante), which answers the second question. 
In the following, we discuss the four notions of unfairness outlined in the in-
troduction. Both questions raised above will be considered separately. We will 
also discuss the necessity to have separated accounts between USO products and 
non-USP products as well as the incentives resulting from compensating the USP 
according to each of these criteria and the appropriate scope of appraisal, i.e. the 
definition of the operations which need to be taken into account in determining 
whether there is an unfair burden and its compensation. 
Note that we apply the notions of (un-)fairness symmetrically. This implies 
that a situation with a net cost may represent an unfair burden, but that it may just 
as well represent an unfair advantage. In such a case, the resulting compensation 
may – in the case of a USO fund – debit the USP and credit its competitor. Such a 
result may seem unrealistic. However, the establishment of a USO fund can be 
interpreted as an insurance device: If a net cost represents an unfair burden, the 
USP is compensated; but if the USP’s situation before compensation is considered 
to represent an unfair advantage over the competitor, the latter is compensated by 
the same rationale. Jaag (2011) discusses in detail why and under what circums-
tances the USO may constitute an unfair competitive advantage. 
CRITERION 1: ABSOLUTE NET COST LEVEL 
According to criterion 1, universal service provision imposes an unfair bur-
den if it reduces the USP’s profit compared to a situation without USO. 
 
This criterion matches the view taken by CERP (2008). However, in their view 
there is only an unfair burden if the net cost exceeds a certain threshold. Hence, if 
the net cost is negligible, its calculation and compensation should be avoided.
20
 
                                                 
20
 CERP (2008) states: „If the reference scenario does not vary fundamentally from the scenario 
with USO the difference can be ignored. Then the cost of administrating a compensation mechan-
ism probably would cost more than it would help the USP” (p. 20). It further argues that “If the 
11
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This criterion allows for a compensation of the net cost irrespective of the actual 
or hypothesized competitive situation in the postal sector. 
Criterion 1 - Ex ante perspective 
Assuming that the USO net cost exceeds a certain threshold, from an ex ante 
perspective, the USP should receive a transfer such that its resulting profit is equal 
to its profit without USO. Hence, the necessary gross transfer    is to be set such 
that 
 
    
    
            (15) 
Superscript m indicates the source of the USO financing and whether the compen-
sation is devised ex ante (ea) or ex post (ep).
21
 If this transfer is financed by state 
funds, the USP’s loss in the least attractive region is just offset by the transfer; the 
competitor’s profit remains unchanged. If there is a pay or play mechanism, the 
transfer must be collected from the competitor with its profit as the relevant tax 
base: 
             (16) 
Hence, the tax rate in that scenario is 
         
 
 
  (17) 
If there is a fund to which all operators contribute, the tax base is the sum of both 
operators’ profits. Hence, the tax rate is determined by 
                     (18) 
which results in 
          
 
      
  (19) 
                                                                                                                                     
current universal service provision exceeds the requirements of the USO, the designated USO 
doesn’t carry a burden” (p. 20). This is certainly true, but in that case there is no net cost in the 
first place. 
21
 In order to keep notation simple, in the following we suppress indices referring to the scenarios 
we discuss. These differ in two dimensions: The criterion by which the unfairness of a burden is 
assessed and whether that assessment is ex ante or ex post. 
12
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Of course, if the USP contributes to financing its own net cost, the criterion by 
which the unfairness of its burden is assessed may not be met from an ex post 
perspective. 
Criterion 1 - Ex post perspective 
In order for the criterion to be met ex post, the USP’s profit with and without uni-
versal service provision must be equal independently of the financing mechanism 
in place. Hence, 
 
   
    
      (20) 
 
In the case of external financing, the resulting equilibrium matches the result ob-
tained by setting the transfer ex ante. With a pay or play mechanism the tax rate is 
now determined as 
 
                             
 
 
  (21) 
 
Similarly, with a compensation fund in place the tax rate is calculated by 
 
                                          
            
 
 
  (22) 
Discussion 
Table 1 shows the operators’ profit levels resulting from a compensation of the 
USO net cost according to criterion 1 with external financing, a pay or play me-
chanism and a USO fund with tax rates set ex ante and ex post, respectively. Note 
that with external funding, the joint profit of both operators equals       which 
is also the joint profit without USO. If the USO net cost is financed within the 
sector, the joint profit is       , irrespective of whether a fund or pay or play 
mechanism is in place. With a fund and from an ex ante perspective, the net cost 
–   is shared among the operators according to their profit levels: the USP bears a 
fraction                  and the competitor bears a fraction       
    . From an ex post perspective, the “pay or play” and fund-based financing 
mechanisms are equivalent, as the net compensations received by the USP are the 
same by definition. Of course, as soon as the competitor’s profit turns negative, 





                                                 
22
 Correctly, the profit levels reported in Tables 1 to 4 would have to have a lower bound at zero. 
13
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m USP profit   
  Competitor profit   
  
ext       
pop ex ante         
fund ex ante     
        
      
  
  
      
pop ex post         
fund ex post         
Table 1: Results for criterion 1 – absolute net cost level. 
Figure 3 displays the distribution of profits between the USP and its competitor 
resulting from a compensation of the USO net cost according to criterion 1.
23
 The 
horizontal axis shows the net cost (  ) ranging from 0 to 30.   and   are kept 
constant such that overall profits in the market are decreasing in the net cost. 
Compensation by state funding is not displayed because it has a trivial effect on 
the operators’ profits. If the net cost is compensated with a pay or play mechanism 
and correctly from an ex ante perspective, the resulting burden on the USP is al-
ways equal to zero. It is also fair ex post. If the USP is compensated by a fund to 
which both operators contribute such that the criterion is met ex ante, there are 
two effects involved. Firstly, The USP contributes according to its profit, which is 
declining in the USO net cost. Secondly, the competitor’s profit and therefore also 
its contribution increases relative to the USP’s. As the total tax base is decreasing 
in the net cost, this implies that the net transfer the USP receives from the compet-
itor increases if the net cost is high.
24
 
The shaded area in Figure 3 shows the range of net cost which represents an 
unfair burden from an ex ante perspective without compensation. Concretely, in 
the displayed example, the net cost is considered to represent an unfair burden for 
values of    , i.e. whenever there is a net cost. 
                                                 
23
 Parameter values are:     ,                . The profit levels with external funding are 
not displayed as they are obviously constant in changes of   (see Table 1). The range of   allows 
for two outcomes in the USO case before compensation: If         , the USP is able to 
make a positive economic profit without compensation. If         , this is not the case. Our 
assumption on the regulatory framework in place allows for both cases.  
24
 The effect that the USP’s profit may be increasing in the USO net cost is due to the operators’ 
profits (wich decrease in the USO net cost) being the tax base for the USO fund. With a per-unit or 
turnover based tax, results may be different. 
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Figure 3: Profits resulting from a net cost compensation according to crite-
rion 1. 
 
With respect to the necessary data to determine a fair compensation, in our model, 
there is no need to separate between universal services (which are offered in all 
markets) and others, but between the unserved markets and the others in order to 
know the net cost   . 
If compensated according to this criterion, the USP faces no incentives to 
minimize its net cost, i.e. to maximize efficiency in the provision of services only 
offered in the USO scenario. If there is a fund with ex ante defined contributions, 
the USP is even incentivized to increase the net cost, because it is overcompen-
sated by its competitor.
25
 
 The relevant business units to consider are all operations which are affected 
by the USO: All processes and infrastructures which would be organized more 
efficiently without USO and all products which would be sold at a different price 
or at a different volume without USO. This scope of appraisal has to be defined 
for the calculation of the net cost of the USO. However, it is not needed to deter-
mine whether the net cost constitutes an unfair burden. 
CRITERION 2: ABSOLUTE PROFIT LEVEL 
According to criterion 2, universal service provision imposes an unfair bur-
den if the USP’s economic profit is negative.26 
 
Hence, universal services should not be offered at a loss. The implicit normative 
reference behind this criterion could be the assumption that competition in fully 
                                                 
25
 If contributions were not on a profit basis but per piece or by turnover, this effect would be even 
stronger, as it would also degrade the entrant’s optimum market coverage. 
26
 The zero-profit criterion does not represent a loss of generality. The USP’s targeted profit could 
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liberalized postal markets results in zero profits of all operators in the absence of a 
universal service obligation. In this context Boldron et al. (2009) rely on the con-
cept of “inequity” and argue: “The burden is unfair if the USP’s market power is 
not sufficient to counterbalance the weight of the USO to maintain a reasonable 
profit” (p. 68). This approach is close to the interpretation of an unfair burden by 
De Donder et al. (2010) who define it as the inability to support the USO finan-
cially. Criterion 2 is also related to the mentioning of a “reasonable profit” in An-
nex I of the Third Postal Directive:  
“The calculation shall take into account all other relevant elements, 
including any intangible and market benefits which accrue to a 
postal service provider designated to provide universal service, the 
entitlement to a reasonable profit and incentives for cost efficien-
cy.” 
Criterion 2 has already been applied in the telecommunications sector: In a recent 
judgment the EU Court of Justice defines an unfair burden as 
“(..) a burden which, for each undertaking concerned, is excessive 
in view of the undertaking’s ability to bear it, account being taken 
of all the undertaking’s own characteristics, in particular the quality 
of its equipment, its economic and financial situation and its market 
share.”27,28 
Criterion 2 – Ex ante perspective29 
From an ex ante perspective, the gross transfer     which is necessary for the 
USP to break even, is calculated as: 
    
                 (23) 
                                                 
27
 Judgment of the EU Court of Justice of 6 October 2010 on case C-222/08. 
28
 In the telecommunications sector, many countries consider the net cost not to be an unfair bur-
den as long as the USP’s market share remains above 80%, possibly in addition to other criteria. 
These countries include Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania and Portugal (see Anacom, 2011). 
29
 In order to simplify notation, we again suppress indices for the relevant criterion and the (ex 
post or ex ante) perspective. 
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If this transfer is financed by state funds, the USP’s overall loss or profit is just 
offset by the transfer (which may well be negative).
30
 If there is a pay or play me-
chanism, the transfer must be collected from the competitor with its profit 
representing the relevant tax base: 
 
                            
     
 
  (24) 
 
If everyone contributes to the fund, the tax base is enlarged by the USO’s own 
profit, such that: 
 
                                     
     
      
  (25) 
Criterion 2 – Ex post perspective  
From an ex post perspective, the USP is supposed to just break even, 
 
   
     (26) 
 
In the case of external financing, the resulting equilibrium matches the result ob-
tained by setting the transfer ex ante. With a pay or play mechanism the tax rate is 
determined as 
 
                           
     
 
  (27) 
 
With a compensation fund it is 
 
                                        
            
     
 
  (28) 
 
Note that as long as          tax rates are negative which implies that the 
competitor’s profit increases by “financing” the USO. 
Discussion 
Table 2 shows the operators’ profit levels resulting from a compensation of the 
USO net cost according to criterion 2. 
  
                                                 
30
 Note that in our model context, this implies that there may not only be an unfair burden, but 
possibly also an unfair profit which is treated symmetrically. 
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m USP profit   
  Competitor profit   
  
ext     
pop ex ante          
fund ex ante 
        
      
   
        
      
pop ex post          
fund ex post          
Table 2: Results for criterion 2 – absolute profit level. 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of profits between the USP and its competitor re-
sulting from a compensation of the USO net cost according to criterion 2.
31
 Be-
cause the USP’s profit is set to zero from an ex ante perspective, the entire indus-
try profit accrues to the competitor. It is declining in the level of the USO net cost. 
In the case that the USP is compensated by a fund to which both operators contri-
bute such that the criterion is met ex ante, the tax rate is negative if       
   Then, ex post, the USP retains part of its profit from the competitive and the 
monopolistic regions. If the net cost exceeds the profit in these two regions, the 
tax rate becomes positive which implies that the USP is a net receiver of transfers 
and that it profits from an increase in the net cost. 
The shaded area in Figure 4 shows the range of net cost which represents an 
unfair burden from an ex ante perspective. Concretely, the net cost is considered 




If the USP’s compensation equals the burden calculated according to this 
approach, there is no need to compute the USO net cost in the first place: Note 
that in Table 2 it suffices to know   and (     ). The net cost    needs not 
to be known separately.  
                                                 
31
 Again, parameter values are:     ,       and on the horizontal axis          . The 
profit levels with external funding are not displayed as they are obviously constant in changes of  
(see Table 2). 
32
 By symmetric application of our fairness criterion, a situation in which         is consi-
dered to be unfair, too, because the USP is able to make a positive economic profit. Then, as an 
alternative to transferring the total market profit to the competitor, the USP’s prices may be regu-
lated in order to reduce profits to zero. 
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Figure 4: Profits resulting from a net cost compensation according to 
criterion 2. 
 
Even though the USP is supposed to break even, it makes a profit in the scenario 
in which it contributes to a fund and the contribution is determined ex ante. The 
reason is that the USP’s contribution to the fund is not considered when the tax 
rate is determined. For low values of the USO net cost, the USP’s profit before 
contributing to the fund is positive, and consequently the tax rate – which is set ex 
ante such that the USP just breaks even – is negative. For high values of the USO 
net cost, the USP’s profit before contributing to the fund is negative, while the tax 
rate is positive. Hence, the USP is overcompensated because, again, because its 
(negative) contribution is not taken into account in the determination of the tax 
rate. 
We have so far assumed that the entire operator’s profit is regulated to zero 
profit. Alternative scopes of the USP’s operations that are regulated to just break 
even may be the provision of individual products within the scope of universal 
services; the provision of universal services as a whole; or the business unit pro-
viding universal services. 
Similarly to the situation with criterion 1, there is no need to have separated 
accounts between USO and non-USO products in this setting. There is not even a 
need to know the net cost because it is just the profit of the relevant business unit 
which is the basis for the evaluation whether the USO creates (or perpetuates) an 
unfair situation. 
As to the incentives resulting from this notion of fairness, the choice of the 
relevant business unit very much affects the USP’ incentives to minimize cost 
associated with the operations relevant in the zero-profit regulation resulting from 
this criterion: The broader the scope of the relevant business unit is, the more 
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CRITERION 3: ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE TO THE COMPETITOR’S 
PROFIT LEVEL 
According to criterion 3, universal service provision imposes an unfair bur-
den if the USP’s profit is lower than its competitor’s. 
Hence, the USP should not be worse off than its competitor. Compared to the two 
first criteria, criterion 3 takes into account the relative position of both operators 
against each other. Compensation then results in a leveling of profit differences 
between operators.  
Criterion 3 – Ex ante perspective 
From an ex ante perspective, the gross transfer    which is necessary for the 
USP’s profit to equal its competitor’s is calculated as: 
    
      
          (29) 
If this transfer is financed by state funds, the difference in the operators’ profits is 
just offset by the transfer; again, the competitor’s profit remains unchanged. In 
case there is a pay or play mechanism, the transfer must be collected from the 
competitor with its profit being the relevant tax base: 
                         
   
 
  (30) 
If everyone contributes to the fund, the tax base is the total of the two operators’ 
profits, such that: 
                                  
   
      
  (31) 
Criterion 3 – Ex post perspective 
From an ex post perspective, the USP’s profit is supposed to equal its competi-
tor’s, 
  
    
   (32) 
In the case of external financing, the resulting equilibrium matches the result ob-
tained by setting the transfer ex ante. With a pay or play mechanism the tax rate is 
determined as 
                                     
   
  
  (33) 
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With a compensation fund it is 
 
                                                   
            
   
  
  (34) 
Discussion 
Table 3 shows the operators’ profit levels resulting from a compensation of the 
USO net cost according to criterion 3. 
 
m USP profit   
  Competitor profit   
  
ext     
pop ex ante         
fund ex ante   
            
      
   
      
      
 
pop ex post                       
fund ex post                       
Table 3: Results for criterion 3 – absolute difference in profit levels. 
 
Figure 5 shows the distribution of profits between the USP and its competitor re-
sulting from a compensation of the USO net cost according to criterion 3.
33
 From 
an ex ante perspective with a pay or play mechanism, as the USP’s profit is fixed, 
increases in the net cost are fully borne by the competitor. The effects of a fund 
are the same as discussed under criterion 1. If the compensation is calculated from 
an ex post perspective, the burden resulting from the net cost of the USO is evenly 
distributed among the two operators. 
The shaded area in Figure 5 shows the range of net cost which represents an 
unfair burden from an ex ante perspective without compensation. Concretely, the 
net cost is considered an unfair burden if         because in this situation 
the USP’s profit is lower than the competitor’s. Consequently and by symmetry, 
also all situations         have to be considered unfair (“unfair advan-
tage”), because in these cases the USP’s profit is higher than the competitor’s. In 
Figure 5, this is the case for            
 
                                                 
33
 Again, parameter values are:     ,       and on the horizontal axis          . The 
profit levels with external funding are not displayed as they are obviously constant in changes of   
(see Table 3). 
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 Figure 5: Profits resulting from a net cost compensation according to 
criterion 3. 
In analogy to criterion 1, this criterion necessitates the calculation of the net cost 
of the USO, but there is no need to keep separate accounts for USO products. 
If the compensation of the USO net cost is implemented according to this 
criterion, the incentive problem associated with the first two criteria discussed is 
now extended to the USP’s competitor because the compensation is contingent on 
its profit as well. 
In real postal markets, profit differences between operators are possibly due 
to asymmetric competition as a result of differences in reputation or asymmetric 
cost structures, asymmetric strategic behavior related to the dynamics of their en-
try decisions or asymmetric management capabilities. Hence, applying this crite-
rion potentially extends far beyond compensation for a burden resulting from uni-
versal service provision. 
Under this criterion, the definition of the relevant business unit is especially
important, but also very difficult because the USP’s profit needs to be compared 
to the competitor’s which may be organized differently. Therefore, a sensible ap-
plication of this criterion necessitates detailed knowledge of USP’s and the com-
petitor’s organization and processes. 
CRITERION 4: RELATIVE DIFFERENCE TO THE COMPETITOR’S 
PROFIT LEVEL 
According to criterion 4, universal service provision imposes an unfair bur-
den if it reduces the USP’s profit compared to a situation without USO by 
more than the competitor’s profit is reduced due to its contribution to USO 
funding. 
Hence, the USP should not be worse off by more than its competitors due to its 
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Criterion 4 – Ex ante perspective 
From an ex ante perspective, the competitor’s profit is unaffected by the USO. 
Hence, the gross transfer   , which is necessary for the USP’s profit difference 
compared to a situation without USO to be zero, is calculated as: 
 
     
    
      (35) 
 
Note that this is the same condition as under criterion 1. 
Criterion 4 – Ex post perspective  
From an ex post perspective, the USP’s profit without and with USO (including 
compensation) is supposed to equal the difference in its competitor’s profit. 
 
Criterion 4a: The absolute difference in profit levels is supposed to be the same: 
 
   
       
    
       
  (36) 
 
With a pay or play mechanism the tax rate is determined as: 
 
                                           
           
 
  
  (37) 
 
With a compensation fund it is 
 
                                              
                      
            
 
  
  (38) 
 








    
  
   (39) 
 
With a pay or play mechanism the tax rate is determined as: 
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With a compensation fund it is 
   
    
       
          
               
 
 
    
       
  
           
 
    
  (41) 
Discussion 
Table 4 shows the operators’ profit levels resulting from a compensation of the 
USO net cost according to criteria 4a and 4b. 
m USP profit   
  Competitor profit   
  
ext       
pop ex ante         
fund ex ante     
        
      
  
  
      
a) pop ex post                 
a) fund ex post                 
b) pop ex post       
  
    
  
  
    
b) fund ex post       
  
    
  
  
    
Table 4: Results for criterion 4 – relative difference in profit levels. 
Figure 6 shows the distribution of profits between the USP and its competitor re-
sulting from a compensation of the USO net cost according to criterion 4.
34
 From 
an ex ante perspective and with a pay or play mechanism, the USO net cost is 
fully borne by the competitor. With a compensation fund designed from an ex 
post perspective, the USP shares the burden and it bears more if the percentage 
difference in profits is the relevant measure due to its profits being higher than the 
competitor’s in a range of low net cost. The higher the net cost is, the closer the 
two profit levels become after compensation. 
The shaded area in Figure 6 shows the range of net cost which represents an 
unfair burden from an ex ante perspective without compensation. Concretely, the 
net cost is considered an unfair burden for all values of     because it is only 
the USP that bears the net cost, while the competitor’s profit is unaffected as long 
as it does not contribute to the financing of the USO. Hence, from an ex ante 
perspective, any positive net cost represents an unfair burden. 
                                                 
34
 Again, parameter values are:     ,       and on the horizontal axis          . The 
profit levels with external funding are not displayed as they are obviously constant in changes of  
(see Table 4). 
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Figure 6: Profits resulting from a net cost compensation according to 
criterion 4. 
 
Applying criterion 4 to determine whether the USO net cost constitutes an unfair 
burden is especially challenging because not only the USP’s profit change needs 
to be assessed, but also the competitor’s. Again, there is no need to have separate 
accounts between those products which are affected by the USO and those which 
are not. Because it is the changes in profits (not absolute profit levels) which de-
termine whether there is an unfair burden, disincentives are similar to the applica-
tion of criterion 1. With respect to the relevant business units, this criterion is sim-
ilar to criterion 3: If operators are organized differently, it is difficult to assess and 
compare changes in their profit levels. 
4. Price Regulation 
So far, we have assumed that there is no profit regulation other than the one im-
plied in the compensation criteria (Assumption 5). We now abandon this assump-
tion by allowing for regulated prices. Specifically, price regulation is not part of 
the USO but applies also in the non-USO scenario, e.g. based on competition law 
or sector-specific regulation. For simplicity, we assume that price regulation is 
such that both operators just break even. This breakeven constraint on the opera-




In the following we discuss the implications of such an assumption on the 
regulatory environment for the results derived in the previous section. With price 
                                                 
35
 Alternatively, price regulation could be assumed to be part of the USO. The implications would 
be straightforward: The ex ante net cost of the USO would then also consist of profit changes in 
the competitive and monopolistic regions. The discussion in section 3 would apply with the limita-
tion that      if according prices are supported by the market. All four criteria are independent 
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 regulation, economic profits in the three regions are no longer constant. Depend-
ing on the market conditions, the net cost may be zero or positive: 
If the market supports prices such that the USP’s and the competitor’s prof-
its are zero in both scenarios with and without USO, the resulting ex ante net cost 
is zero by definition. This implies that all four criteria coincide and neither of the 
two operators makes a profit. If the competitor’s price is not regulated, criterion 1 
(absolute net cost level) and criterion 2 (absolute profit level) coincide and there is 
no compensation because these criteria are independent of the competitor’s profit. 
Additional compensation in excess of allowed price adjustments is needed accord-
ing to criterion 3 (absolute difference to competitor’s profit level). The condition 
in Criterion 4 (relative difference to competitor’s profit level) is trivially met be-
cause neither of the two operators bear a burden.
36
 
If the market supports regulated prices such that the operators break even
without USO but the USP incurs a loss with USO, criteria 1 and 2 coincide again. 
If there is a competitor in both scenarios, from an ex ante perspective, criterion 3 
also coincides with criteria 1 and 2 because all three equitable benchmarks are 
equal to zero. From an ex post perspective, criterion 3 can be applied as discussed 
in Section 3. Applying criterion 4, the sub-cases 4a and 4b coincide because both 
the USP’s and the competitor’s profits are equal to zero without USO. If the com-
petitor’s price is not regulated, criteria 3, 4a and 4b can be applied as discussed in 
Section 3. The according results do not coincide because the two operators’ prof-
its are different in the non-USO scenario. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we have discussed four different criteria by which the (un-)fairness 
of a burden could be assessed and by which the appropriateness and the level of 
compensation may be determined. The four criteria differ by the relevant equita-
ble benchmark: The first criterion sets the USP’s profit in relation to its profit 
without universal service provision. The second criterion considers the USP’s 
absolute profit level. The third criterion compares the USP’s profit to its competi-
tor’s. The fourth criterion compares changes in the USP’s and a competitor’s prof-
its due to the USO. 
Based on a stylized theoretical model with endogenous market entry and 
coverage, we have demonstrated the impact of these four criteria concerning the 
“unfairness” of the burden represented by the USO net cost on the distribution of 
                                                 
36 If the market did not support prices such that the USP’s profit is zero in either of the scenarios 
with and without USO, no competitor would enter the market and criteria 3 and 4 become mea-
ningless. Since also the USP would not be active in the market without USO, criteria 1 and 2 coin-
cide and can be applied as discussed in Section 3 with the limitation that only external funds are 
available. 
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profits among the operators. This analysis hints at potential unintended conse-
quences of implementing a compensation or cost sharing mechanism. 
Table 5 summarizes the information requirements, i.e. whether it is neces-
sary to have separated accounts between USO products and non-USP products, 
the incentives resulting from compensating the USP and aspects of the definition 
of the operations which need to be taken into account in determining whether 




Effect on Incentives 
 
Definition of Relevant 
Business Units 
1 Need to have separate 
accounts between those 
products which are af-
fected by the USO and 
those which are not 
Disincentives limited to 
products which are af-
fected by the USO 
Only necessary for calcula-
tion of the net cost; not to 
determine whether there is 
an unfair burden 
2 No need to calculate the 
net cost; no accounting 
separation needed 
Implicit rate of return 
regulation for all products; 
strong disincentives to 
realize efficiency gains 
Determines scope of rate 
of return regulation 
3 Need to have separate 
accounts between those 
products which are af-
fected by the USO and 
those which are not 
Disincentives are aggra-
vated because implicit rate 
of return regulation is 
extended to the competitor 
Potential asymmetries 
between operators make 
application of fairness 
criterion extremely diffi-
cult 
4 Need to have separate 
accounts between those 
products which are af-
fected by the USO and 
those which are not 
Disincentives limited to 
products which are af-
fected by the USO 
Potential asymmetries 
between operators make 
application of fairness 
criterion extremely diffi-
cult 
Table 5: Comparison of fairness criteria. 
 
The choice of a criterion is to be based on equity rather than on efficiency consid-
erations.
37
 In general, each of the criteria results in a different distribution of prof-
its. The choice of one among the others is therefore to be oriented on the goals to 
be reached by the compensation. It also depends on the available financing me-
chanism: If the net cost is compensated with external funds, criterion 2 is proba-
bly the most realistic one because tax payers would not accept financing a profita-
ble USP. If competitors have to contribute to the funding of the USO, changes in 
their profit should be considered, too. Therefore, criterion 4 should be applied: It 
                                                 
37
 In general, the choice of the fairness criterion also yields efficiency effects (see e.g. Jaag et al., 
2009). However, in the model used in this paper, there are no allocative effects of the compensa-
tion mechanism and hence efficiency is not an issue. 
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is closest to the concept of reciprocity which empirical evidence shows to be an 
important motive in social behavior. 
Sequentially calculating the net cost of the USO, determining whether there 
is an unfair burden and then finding a financing mechanism generally (and from 
an ex post perspective) does not result in the distribution of profits sought after. 
Specifically, the implementation of a compensation fund results in a systematic 
undercompensation of the USP in almost all regimes. Hence, an integrated ap-
proach is necessary to cope with this issue. This implies that distributive outcomes 
are assessed ex post. Our analysis also suggests that price regulation strongly inte-
racts with the compensation of the USO net cost: With price regulation some of 
the criteria discussed reduce to a single criterion. 
There are important incentive issues associated with the compensation prob-
lem. In principle, they can be dealt with the same way as in incentive-compatible 
price-cap regulation: By determining the amount of compensation ex ante for a 
number of years and thereby restoring the operators as residual claimants of their 
efforts to be efficient. 
Our analysis is based on a very stylized model. Multiple USO dimensions, 
asymmetries in the operators’ technology or specific customer preferences to-
wards one of the operators are not considered. Neither are alternative bases for 
contributions of operators to a USO fund. These would not only yield distribu-
tional effects but also affect the equilibrium allocation in the postal sector. The 
consideration of such issues as well as an implementation of such models when 
determining the appropriate compensation of unfair burdens in real markets is left 
to future research. 
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